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  Purpose of Paper
The purpose of the policy brief is to identify the underlying concepts, 
particularly regulated flexibility, behind the labour law reforms which took 
place during the 1990s with regard to the regulation of the individual 
employment relation. The paper explores whether the new laws have lived 
up to the original thinking, and if not, the ways in which the laws could be 
improved.
  General Statement
Because South Africa is a Constitutional state with an entrenched Bill of 
Rights, and in particular, a suite of labour rights, labour market policy choices 
are constrained in South Africa, and the justification for any limitation of 
these rights is not simply a matter of economic choice.
  Regulated Flexibility
The concept of regulated flexibility underpinned the recommendations of 
the Labour Market Commission and the Minister of Labour’s approach to 
labour law reform during the 1990s.
Regulated Flexibility is the framework, comprising of limits and mechanisms, 
through which an appropriate balance is determined between the employers’ 
interest in flexibility1 and the employees’ interest in security.2 Regulated 
flexibility recognises that due to the dynamic and diverse nature of the 
	 There	are	three	kinds	of	flexibility:	employment	flexibility	(the	freedom	to	change	employment	levels	quickly	and	cheaply),		
	 wage	flexibility	(the	freedom	to	determine	wage	levels	without	constraint)	and,	functional	flexibility	(the	freedom	to	alter	work		
	 processes,	terms	and	conditions	of	employment	quickly	and	cheaply).
	 	Security	comprises	labour	market	security	(opportunities	for	employment),	employment	security	(protection	against	arbitrary		
	 loss	of	employment),	job	security	(protection	against	arbritrary	loss	or	alteration	of	the	job),	work	security	(health	and	safety	in		
	 the	workplace)	and	representation	security	(representation	in	the	workplace).
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labour market, there is a need for employers and workers to be able to adapt 
standards to suit the particular needs of a sector, workplace or subsector.
The various mechanisms which are employed to achieve a balance 
include:
•	 Various forms of dialogue between role players such as collective 
bargaining (at workplace or sectoral level) and social dialogue (at national 
or regional level),
•	 Administrative discretion bounded by clear guidelines, 
•	 Administrative determinations made by the minister in respect of any 
category of employers or employees,
•	 Soft law in the form of codes,
•	 The setting of floors and ceilings for enterprises,
•	 And the selective application of legislative standards or requirements.
  The Individual Employment Relation
According to section 23(1) of the Final Constitution, everyone has the 
right to fair labour practices. Both the LRA4 and the BCEA5 gave effect 
to this right by giving protection to certain incidents of the individual 
employment relationship. The 1995 LRA fully codified the existing 
jurisprudence in respect of dismissal. It preserved what was left of 
the unfair labour practices jurisprudence in respect of the individual 
employment relationship (promotion, training, suspension, disciplinary 
action and the failure to reinstate or re-employ a former employee in 
	 	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	South	Africa	(Act	08	of	996)
	 	Labour	Relations	Act	66	of	995.
5	 	Basic	Conditions	of	Employment	Act	75	of	997
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terms of an agreement) in a transitional provision for later deliberation and 
incorporation into the BCEA. This provision was, however, retained in the 
final LRA with little change, with no serious policy review of the residual 
unfair labour practices. 
The paper (on which this Policy Brief is based) argues that, had the residual 
unfair labour practices been subjected to searching policy scrutiny, it would 
have become clear that they do not meet the requirement of regulated 
flexibility and that there is no need to regulate these practices.
The paper reviews the specific incidents of the individual employment 
relationship and offers proposals to amend the law.
  Recruitment and Hiring Practices
Hiring and recruitment practices are not listed in the definition of unfair labour 
practices and accordingly they are not subject to judicial oversight. There 
are, however, three exceptions: the prohibition of discrimination in hiring 
and recruitment decisions under the EEA6, the prohibition of victimisation 
in recruitment or hiring decisions, and the judicial review of appointment 
decisions under administrative law.
The paper argues that recruitment and hiring practices are sufficiently 
regulated by the EEA’s prohibition of discrimination and the prohibition of 
victimisation by the LRA and there is no need to regulate it any further. 
Therefore, the administrative law remedy with respect of hiring in the public 
service ought to be restricted to corrupt and inept appointments only.
Additionally the remedy for unfair discrimination in appointment decisions 
ought to be restricted to damages only.
6	 	Employment	Equity	Act	55	of	998
Regulated Flexibility: Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA
 
  Probation
At present, the LRA sets a stringent test and complicated test for the 
dismissal of employees on probation, placing a heavy burden on employers 
and little room for flexibility.
The paper proposes that ordinary dismissal protections (other than 
automatically unfair dismissals) do not apply to employees with less than a 
stipulated period of service. In order to prevent abuse of terminating and re-
employing just before the expiry of the stipulated period to avoid the onset 
of protections, an employee’s period of service should include all previous 
service with that employer or a related employer.
  Training
There is no need for the judicial regulation of training, particularly given the 
Department of Labour’s extensive programmes to train, re-skill and educate 
employees in terms of the Skills Development Act.
  Promotion
There is little to distinguish the decision to promote an employee from 
the decision to hire an employee. The decision to promote an employee 
should, therefore, be excluded from judicial review as is the case with hiring 
decisions. Of course, the same exceptions (discrimination, victimization and 
corruption) that apply to hiring decisions should apply to promotion.
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  Demotion
 The LRA provides a remedy for unfair conduct relating to demotion. There 
is, however, sufficient protection for the employee under the law of contract 
(demotion is not permissible unless the employee agrees to it) and unfair 
dismissal (a refusal to agree to demotion as an alternative to dismissal will 
be tested for fairness like any other dismissal). 
  Benefits
The courts have decided that unfair conduct relating to benefits should be 
restricted to a contractual or a statutory right to benefits. There is therefore 
no need for an unfair labour practice remedy for this form of conduct since 
remedies already exist in contract and delict.
  Discipline (short of dismissal) 
Since the power to dismiss as a disciplinary measure is already protected,there 
is no need to subject disciplinary measures short of dismissal to judicial 
scrutiny. A code of practice and model of disciplinary procedures as a guide 
to employers and trade unions should be issued instead.
  Suspension
There are two different kinds of suspension; a suspension pending a 
disciplinary enquiry and suspension without pay as an alternative penalty 
to dismissal.
Suspension as a penalty does not require judicial review because it can 
only be effected with consent and the refusal to consent as an alternative 
to dismiss will be the subject of review in an enquiry into the fairness of the 
dismissal. 
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There is, however, a strong need for the regulation of suspension pending a 
disciplinary hearing, particularly in the public service. There are two abuses, 
namely arbitrary decisions and inordinate periods of suspension. The first 
abuse could be curtailed by judicial review of the decision supplemented by 
a code of good practice. The second abuse requires, firstly, the creation of 
a statutory obligation to conduct disciplinary hearings in a reasonable time 
and the power to strike down tardy disciplinary proceedings, and secondly, 
institutional reform in the public service.
  Dismissal
The Labour Relations Act describes what is required of employers in regard 
to dismissals. It provides reasons for which an employer could never 
dismiss (automatically unfair grounds)7 and reasons for which an employer 
could dismiss (misconduct, incapacity and operational requirements).8 In 
this latter category, the LRA requires substantive and procedural fairness, 
the details of which are included in codes of good practice. 
The code originally embraced the idea of regulated flexibility. The first line 
of the code states that the code is “intentionally general” and “departures 
from the norms established by this code may be justified in proper 
circumstances.”
There are a number of problems with the current situation with regard to 
dismissal which requires change.
•	 There is a need for the code of practice to be regularly updated to keep 
up with changing jurisprudence, as was the original intention of the 
legislators.
7	 	Section	87
8	 	Section88
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•	 The codes of good practice are frequently ignored by parties when dealing 
with dismissals. To remedy this, the CCMA should issue guidelines 
requiring reference to the codes and justification for departing from them. 
Additionally, the failure to take the code into account should be a ground 
for review.
•	 As far as dismissals for misconduct and incapacity are concerned, 
there is an over-emphasis on complex and expensive pre-dismissal 
proceedings by arbitrators and commissioners. The code of good practice 
calls for a much less burdensome and a more flexible approach, with no 
requirement of a formal hearing. There is a need to strengthen the code 
and make its objectives clearer and to train commissioners to apply the 
code correctly.
•	 With regard to dismissals for operational requirements, at present the 
LRA and the code of good practice set out a complicated process (s189) 
with little room for variation. It is suggested these proceedings place too 
heavy a burden on small businesses. The paper proposes that small 
businesses should be excluded from the detailed requirements of section 
189 of the LRA but subject to the general obligation to dismiss fairly and 
a code of good practice which should  provide a simpler procedure.
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  Collective Bargaining
The promotion of a voluntary system of collective bargaining is the principle 
manner in which the 1995 LRA gave effect to regulated flexibility. Sectoral 
level collective bargaining was strengthened and the coverage broadened. 
It was decided, however, that the regulation of collective bargaining at the 
level of the workplace would be left to the bargaining council.
There are a number of problems with the current system that require 
attention.
•	 The fragmentary coverage of bargaining councils ensures that many 
workplaces are not covered by sectoral bargaining. At the same time, 
there is a lack of a broad demarcation of sectors. There is, therefore, a 
need to demarcate sectors, to consolidate existing bargaining councils, 
and establish bargaining councils in sectors where there are none.
•	 A number of reforms were made to the law during the 1990s and early 
2000s to allow bargaining councils to perform more functions.9 However, 
the councils struggle to perform the roles given to them due to lack of 
support from the department. 
•	 Bargaining councils were given the regulatory function of setting terms 
and conditions of employment (in particular wages) for their respective 
sectors in light of their particular needs. This function is however 
weakened since the BCEA set minimum standards from which sectoral 
level agreements may not depart. In this regard, the BCEA should be 
amended to permit greater variation of employment standards by sector 
level agreements and determinations. 
9	 	Including	the	power	to	regulate	collective	relations	in	the	sector	and	to	develop	sectoral	policy	for	submission	to	NEDLAC	or		
	 another	appropriate	forum.
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•	 The regulatory function of sectoral level bargaining requires that sectoral 
agreements set minimum wages and working conditions, whilst actual 
levels are set at the level of the workplace, which may of course vary 
among different workplaces, depending on size and needs. However, 
in reality, parties have set sectoral agreements that set actual terms 
and conditions, with no room for variation. To remedy this situation, 
the department of labour should develop a draft policy on the nature 
of sectoral agreements, which should be submitted to NEDLAC for 
consideration and agreement.
It is also proposed that a carefully considered discretionary extension 
mechanism should be introduced (with the minister of labour holding such 
discretion) along with guidelines and a code of good practice. The discretion 
of the minister should also only be employed based on a published labour 
market policy and after being negotiated at NEDLAC.
  New Role for Sector Level Bargaining
At present, many of the atypically employed and those people working in the 
informal labour market are not covered by collective bargaining at the level 
of the workplace. However, sectoral collective bargaining may provide these 
workers with a forum.
Collective agreements should apply to all forms of dependent work. This 
may require amendments to the LRA and the BCEA.  Labour market policy 
should be formulated to guide bargaining councils and the Employment 
Standards Commission in regulating these kinds of employment.
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  Conclusion  
It is important to note that any changes to labour market policy have to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. A blanket exclusion from the provisions of 
labour legislation is not a possibility – any limitation of rights or difference in 
treatment must not only be justified but carefully targeted.
